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Sensory Dots, No-Self, and Stream-Entry:
The Significance of Buddhist Contemplative Development
for Transpersonal Studies1
Charles D. Laughlin
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada

Based on the author’s nearly 50 years of meditation, it is observed that as a given alternative state is
accessed and used over the span of years, experiences and capacities within that state are not merely
static but may themselves shift as a practitioner develops neuropsychologically. An ethnographer
using a substance within the context of a cultural practice may gain helpful direct insights into
that cultural practice, but the researcher may fail to realize that the state attained by a novice may
be substantively different from that gained by an elder or shaman with years of experience in the
practice. The author’s meditation led to insight that visual and other phenomenal experiences are
constructed out of sensory particles, or sensory dots. This practice later led to a state in which pure
awareness was aware only of itself, and to an experiential realization of the Buddhist teaching of no-self.
Keywords: polyphasic culture, Buddhism, phenomenology, stream-entry, sensory dots, no-self
Far better than sovereignty over the earth, or far better than going to the abodes of the devas,
or far better than ruling supreme over the entire universe, is the attainment of Sotāpatti Fruition.
The Buddha, Dhammapada, verse 178
A monk once went to Gensha, and wanted to learn where the entrance to the path of truth was.
Gensha asked him, “Do you hear the murmuring of that brook?” “Yes, I hear it,” answered the
monk. “There is the entrance,” the Master instructed him.
C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, ¶878
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thnographers often work among what I call
polyphasic cultures2 —that is, among peoples who
consider experiences had in alternative states of
consciousness to be both real and significant. Hence,
an experientially grounded ethnography will inevitably
have to incorporate the more transpersonal domains
of experience, and the realizations and psychological
transformations that stem from such experiences.
However, despite such realizations often finding their
way into cultural expressions as narratives, mythopoeic
symbolism, ritual enactments and art, the significance
is often missed due to the lack of requisite transpersonal
experience on the part of the fieldworker or lab
researcher. As my colleagues and I have argued many
times elsewhere, the study of transpersonal experiences
requires transpersonal methods (Laughlin, 1989, 1994a,
2011; Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990). Simply
put, if I want to know, I have to do what is necessary

to know. As Ken Wilber (2005) suggested in his book,
A Sociable God, one begins the process of inquiry with
the injunction, “If you want to know this, do this”
(p. 156). When one does “this” (i.e., meditate, dance,
take the magic herb, carry out the ritual) then certain
experiences arise as a consequence, and then perhaps a
conversation ensues with one’s host or guide, one learns
what those experiences mean both for oneself and for
one’s host culture.
In this paper I want to share how transpersonal
experiences arising for me along a path of spiritual
inquiry may, in retrospect, be understood as part of
a single maturational process. I will describe several
experiences I have had over the course of nearly 50 years
as a meditator, and roughly 35 years as a Buddhist insight
meditation practitioner, seven years of which were spent as
a Tibetan Tantric Buddhist monk. I want to sketch these
experiences in order to show how one follows the other
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in a retrospectively obvious and causally efficacious way. I
will take the reader from my realization of the pixilated
nature of sensory experience, through the realization
of the impermanence of the self to the experience of
what Theravada Buddhists call “stream-entry,” the first
conscious experience of Nirvana. I offer this description,
not to replace the necessity of directly experiencing these
way-points (after all, “if you want to know this, do this”),
but rather: (1) to sensitize transpersonal anthropologists
and other researchers to the developmental dimension
of transpersonal experiences, and (2) to underscore
the empirical evidence for states of consciousness that
transcend sensory experience. The terminology I will use
will be from both Theravada Buddhism and Husserlian
phenomenology. Although the goals of Buddhist and
Husserlian phenomenology are different, I am mixing
their terminology here because: (1) both held sway in
my own development, and I have used both frameworks
in making sense of my experiences, (2) both Theravada
Buddhist methods and Husserlian methods constitute
transcendental phenomenologies (Hanna, 1993a, 1995;
Larrabee, 1981),3 (3) both methods are productive of
good science (Chavan, 2007), and (4) in some cases
the Husserlian interpretations and terminology are
less loaded with ideological baggage than are Buddhist
accounts.
Learning To Meditate
was originally taught to meditate by one of my professors,
the late Dr. LeRoy Johnson, while doing graduate
work in anthropology at the University of Oregon in
1967. LeRoy showed me how to sit in half-lotus position
and focus attention on the rising and falling of my belly.
I quickly learned that with increasing concentration
to the exclusion of distractions (other objects, verbal
chatter, etc.) came a deeper and deeper calm leading to
single-minded bliss-states I would later learn were typical
of absorption states (samādhi, jhāna; see Gunaratana,
1988; Snyder & Rasmussen, 2009), and that the practice
was in fact samatha—cultivation of single-mindedness
leading eventually to a special state of complete calm and
one-pointed concentration that Buddhists call upacara
samādhi, or “access concentration,” so named because
the mind is free to choose to concentrate upon an object
or remain indifferent to the object, and thus may choose
to enter absorption states or not.
But I am getting ahead of my story. At the time I
learned to easily enter samādhi using belly concentration,

I
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I knew nothing about Buddhism or insight meditation,
and simply meditated to relax and enter bliss-states as
a palliative to the rigors of graduate school. I became
adept at what I later understood was, from the Buddhist
point of view, frozen-ice samādhi—frozen, because the
state of mind is utterly devoid of any burning questions
that would lead to any insight into the nature of mind.
Inevitably, I grew bored with bliss-highs and dropped
meditation work for the following decade or so.
When I took up meditation again, it was because
I was having experiences that triggered avid questions
about consciousness. A years-long process of unfolding
dream-work that I have described in detail elsewhere
(Laughlin, 2011, pp. 409–421), accompanied by taking
up hatha yoga practice, lead eventually to spontaneous
transpersonal experiences and serious questions about
mind that had been absent from my earlier so-called
frozen ice attitude. I sought and found guidance from
Buddhist teachers4 in Canada under whose tutelage I
learned the causally entangled relationship between
tranquil single-mindedness (samatha) and mindfulness
(or vipassana; see Goleman, 1984; Solé-Leris, 1986;
Thanissaro, 1997; Johansson, 1969. pp. 88–102S). It
was during lengthy meditation retreats, ostensibly under
the influence of Buddhist methods and guidance, that
I learned to establish what Edmund Husserl (1989)
liked to call the phenomenological attitude—that is, the
suspension of everyday conditioned interpretations of,
reactions to, and beliefs about the world and the self (i.e.,
the natural and personal attitudes) and the cultivation of
a series of epochés 5 that allows the contemplative to study
aspects of consciousness through direct introspection
(Husserl, 1931; Kockelmans, 1967; Miller, 1984; Schmitt,
1959). This shift in consciousness is not a momentary
choice, but involves a fundamental reorganization
of perception with life-long consequences. Arthur
Deikman (1982) has argued that mature contemplation
involves a process of deautomatization, “an undoing of
the automatic processes that control perception and
cognition” (p. 139)—a freeing-up, as it were, of natural
attitude conditioning requisite to the development of
the phenomenological attitude.
Any discernable attribute of consciousness
may be bracketed, deautomatized, and studied using
mindfulness methods. For instance, one may choose
to isolate the color red and study the gradation of hues
cognized as red, or the feelings evoked by reddish
hues. Or, one may choose to bracket the relationship
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between visual patterns on a page and the meaning they
evoke as words. Wine tastings under a sommelier are
essentially phenomenological exercises leading to a more
sophisticated understanding of the flavorful nuances of
wine. The potentially bracketable qualities and processes
of experience are virtually endless. However, some foci
are more auspicious than others, depending upon the
goal or ideology associated with the meditation being
practiced. In Buddhist psychology, focusing upon the
impermanence of phenomena is more important and
developmentally productive than focusing upon discrete
qualia. In Husserlian terms, this whole process of selfinquiry is called phenomenological reduction (Held,
2003, p. 21), the intent of which is to learn to parse raw
sensory presentation (the things themselves) from kneejerk interpretation.
As any seasoned meditator will attest, all sorts of
strange sensory experiences arise during the maturation
of contemplation. Many of these experiences are what
Buddhist psychology calls signs (nimitta), some of which
are what may be called countersigns (patibhaganimitta)
for the particular meditation object upon which one is
focused (see Buddhaghosa, 1991; Laughlin, McManus,
& Webber, 1985; Snyder & Rasmussen, 2009, pp. 57–
63). Regardless of the object of concentration (breath,
heartbeat, water, flame, sensations arising from the soles
of the feet, kasin.a practice 6, so forth), eventually most
meditators will experience imagery that is associated
with that object. For instance, many who meditate
upon the breath moving in and out of the nostrils see
bubbles of one sort or another (“fish eggs,” “bubble
wrap,” so forth). Meditation on other objects may
result in intricate lacy patterns, smoke, various light
phenomena, and so forth. These are the countersigns
of the object of consciousness. They are causally and
unconsciously associated with the object, but are not
logically predictable from the object. Objects are
associated with numerous countersigns, and these
countersigns tend to indicate stages in the development
of the meditation. Every Zen koan has its countersign(s)
and by reporting these to the teacher will determine
where the meditator is along the path of contemplative
maturation. Frequently, the arising of countersigns are
interpreted by meditators as transpersonal experiences.
Viewed in this way, the range of transpersonal
experiences had by a serious practitioner over time may
be considered as way stations along a maturing spiritual
path.
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If, instead of remaining focused on the original
object (breath, eidetic image, sensations at the bottom of
the feet in walking meditation, etc.), the meditator shifts
focus to the countersign, applying sufficient intensity of
concentration may lead to absorption (jhāna) into the
sign—that is, the collapsing of the watching-watched
(subject-object) duality. Absorption is a natural function
of an interested brain. One normally experiences
absorption when watching a movie in a cinema, or while
engrossed in a good book. But the kind of absorption
I am describing here is into an image produced wholly
within the mind’s eye. Moreover, the concentration
may well be beyond the intensity one normally brings
to reading or watching a film. In addition, the sign is
usually simple and not very dynamic. Again, the sign
is associated with the original object—it is a sign of the
object.
Absorption states are frequently numinous,
especially for beginning meditators. Among other
things, the jhānas are often accompanied by bliss (pīti) of
varying intensities, dynamics and locations in the body.
Meditators may describe themselves as feeling a frisson,
a “rush,” joyous, centered, exhilarated, pleasurable,
ecstatic, and so forth. The loci of bliss may be in the
so-called chakras (energy centers in the body), perhaps
also flowing up or down the central channel. For the
duration of the absorption and for a period afterwards,
the meditator feels good, comfortable, tranquil and
energized (Laughlin, 1994b). Buddhist meditators
are taught to utilize these experiences to energize
their insight practice—like plugging-in to a psychic
battery—but not to make the mistake of considering
the absorption state as the goal of insight practice, no
matter how numinous the experience. When I was
early on practicing frozen-ice samadhi, I had become
essentially a pīti-junkie.
Apprehending Sensorial "Dots"
he pursuit and maturation of the phenomenological
attitude typically produces a state of mind marked
by astonishment and wonder—what Zen practitioners
call the beginners mind (Suzuki, 1970)—and by a
cognition relatively free of the constraints of received,
culturally conditioned frames of reference (the natural
attitude of everyday consciousness; see Fink, 1981). This
freedom allows the inner-directed study of the factors
of consciousness as objects of awareness, rather than
conditioned attention to phenomena naïvely presumed
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in the natural attitude to be “out there” somewhere and
requiring response (see Funke, 1981). The contemplative
comes to realize that each and every state of mind is
componential and unitary. In addition, the contemplative
can slow the process of neurocognitive entrainment
down to the very simple so as to discern the atomic levels
of experience: pixels, temporal epochs, impermanence of
objects, purity, parallel processes, componential nature
of the empirical ego, or me (and cognized ego, or I), and
visible and invisible causation.
This is a very crucial point, for even if one
has access to the very finest neuroscience available, if
the phenomenological data remain naïve (pre-epoché,
pre-reduction, natural attitude laden), it is very likely
the neurophenomenology will be naïve as well—and
very likely erroneous. For example, it is apparent to
most mature contemplatives known to the author that
at some point in their meditative careers they came to
realize that sensory data are pixelated, particulated,
or granular to perception (Laughlin, 1992; Laughlin,
McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990). In other words, there
comes a time when many contemplatives reach a specific
epoché within which they are able to perceive that their
entire sensorium (multimodal sensory field) is made up
of points (dots, granules, particles, bindus, yods, and so
forth). After the epoché, the sensorium is experienced as
a field of flickering, pulsating pixels that is perceptually
and cognitively distinguishable into sensory modes,
and within sensory modes into forms and events. The
fundamental act of perception is the abstraction and
reinforcement of invariant features within the order of
an unfolding and dissolving field of dots (see Gibson,
1979). In my experience, apprehending the pixelated
nature of the senses is easiest to realize visually, but
eventually sounds, tastes, touches are all made up of
sensory particles. Once one realizes this epoché, one may
easily apprehend the granular texture of the sensorium
at will. Furthermore, when concentration upon sensory
molecular pixels reaches a sufficient intensity, awareness
of gross sensory objects is lost, including the ego (see
below).
Whether or not a theorist has attained this dot
epoché is evident by how they experience and think
about their own consciousness, and what understanding
of consciousness they project upon others. For instance,
David Chalmers (1996), the Australian philosopher of
mind, has famously defined what he called the hard
problem of consciousness. By that he meant, after all
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the mental functions are explained by reference to their
underlying neurophysiology, the fact of experience
remains a puzzle.
Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in
visual and auditory information-processing, we have
visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep
blue, the sensation of middle C? . . . . It is widely
agreed that experience arises from a physical basis,
but we have no good explanation of why and how it
so arises. Why should physical processing give rise
to a rich inner life at all? (Chalmers, 1995, p. 201)
Nowhere in his presentation of the “hard problem” did
he evince the epoché noted above. He did not seem to
realize that his patch of “deep blue” is (1) pixelated, and
(2) a cognitive operation of his own brain. A patch of blue
is the brain’s symbolic representation of electromagnetic
energies striking the retinae and mediated by special
networks of cells. In other words, blue dots are the
brain’s way of representing a specific range of observable
electromagnetic frequencies to itself. When one realizes
that all sensory experience is a cognitive act on the part
of the brain, then the so-called hard problem vanishes,
or is at least rendered much easier.
No-Self
ealizing that sensory experience is pixelated, and that
pixels and fields of pixels arise and pass away each
and every moment of consciousness leads quite naturally
to understanding that all things constructed from these
sensorial dots are likewise impermanent, including all
thoughts, images, feelings, somatic sensations, perceptual
qualia, and so forth. This is one route to realizing that
everything one is conditioned to associate with the
ego—the personal or participating self, that which seems
to be me—is also impermanent. Thus it is not surprising
that disciplined contemplation will eventually lead to
the fall of the illusion of the permanent ego. This indeed
happened in my case. Sometime around 1980 I was
meditating in a hotel room on the Rue des Ecoles near
the College de France in Paris when I suddenly realized
(an instantaneous intuitive insight) that all sensory
modes are pixelated. Prior to that I had assumed that
only visual sensations were made up of dots. The “Rue
des Ecoles realization” (as I have called it ever since) led
directly to the realization of no-self soon thereafter.
There is no better example of the transformational
capacity of self-reflection than the realization of no-self
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(or not-self; see Thanissaro, 1999); that is, the realization
that there is no such thing as an empirical ego, no
permanent soul-entity, no little homunculus sitting inside
the brain watching the sensorial movie. One realizes that
the belief in a permanent ego is an artifact of cultural
conditioning that is easily dispelled by phenomenological
self-reflection—by disciplined introspection leading to
direct experiences that bring one’s received self-model
into question. Because the realization of no-self is
derived empirically—that is, introspectively—it is safe
to say that any cultural tradition that encourages selfreflection as a path to self-knowledge and wisdom will
lead inevitably to apprehending that nothing that arises
in consciousness is permanent. This realization is not a
matter of taste, not a matter of opinion or ideological
commitment, not a matter of cultural custom, but
rather is one of empirical seeing of the self as it really is, a
transcendental and dynamic self-system.
Anatta
The best known tradition of self-reflection leading
to the realization of no-self, and the elevation of that
realization to a cornerstone of an ethno-phenomenology,
is the Buddhist doctrine of anatta (also known as no-self
or selflessness; see Austin, 1998; Carlisle, 2006; Collins,
1982; Federman, 2011; Flanagan, 2011, pp. 93–98;
Harvey, 1995; Metzinger, 2009; Morris, 1994; Smith,
2010; Thanissaro, 1999). In Theravada Buddhism, the
realization of anatta occurs automatically as a fruit of
insight meditation (vipassana). In a famous treatise
on insight meditation, the great Burmese meditation
master, Mahāsi Sayādaw (1994), noted that the belief
in a permanent ego falls away during stage four of a
19-stage maturation process leading to the realization
of Nibbāna (Nirvana) and its fruits. What Mahāsi’s
discourse obviously implies is that personal identification
with an enculturated self-model is common to all people
everywhere, even in Buddhist societies. This is a point
that ethnographer Melford Spiro (1993) made about his
Burmese Buddhist hosts. Aware of the central teaching
of anatta, he wished to see how that teaching influenced
peoples’ self-understanding. Spiro noted that:
After a few months into my field work .  . . it became
apparent that I would have to change my research
plans because I discovered that the Burmese villagers
with whom I lived and worked do not internalize
the doctrine of anatta. Instead, they strongly believe
in the very ego or soul that this doctrine denies.
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They do so on two accounts, experiential and
pragmatic. First, because they themselves experience
a subjective sense of a self, the culturally normative
concept of an ego-less person does not correspond to
their personal experience. Second, and perhaps more
important, they find the doctrine of selfless person
not congenial to their soteriological [expectation of
salvation] aspirations. (Spiro, 1993, p. 119)
Spiro’s findings among the Burmese mirror my own
among Tibetan Buddhist monks. Individuals rising to
the realization of no-self are exceptional in any society;
even those who’s local epistemology or ethnopsychology
describe the emptiness of the transcendental self.
Tibetan Buddhist monks may learn texts by heart that
extol the virtues of realizing no-self (the anatman), but
few actually practice the advanced insight meditations
leading to this realization. Indeed, if the realization of
no-self were all that easy, disciplined methods leading to
that realization would be irrelevant.
No-Self in the West
Practitioners of certain Western phenomenological and spiritual traditions have reached the same
realization based upon meditations focusing upon the
impermanent contents of the empirical ego. The great
phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl, concluded from his
own introspection that the ego is essentially empty of
content and is really no more than an enduring point
of view upon ever-changing content—a transcendental
ego as Husserl liked to say, tongue in cheek (see Husserl,
1989, pp. 103–104). The ego is an ineluctable focus
of intentionality, a perpetual orientation of attention,
perception, feeling, and cognition directed toward the
world of experience (Husserl, 1969, p. 23). A meditator
inevitably comes to this conclusion because she or he
finds that every content one focuses upon as “me”—as
“my” self—is impermanent; that is, all contents arise and
pass away within the sphere of consciousness; hence, the
old Sufi saw: you can’t step in the same river twice. All that
remains of “my” self is an enduring point of view always
present within the stream of consciousness, a point of
view that is devoid of permanent content, and yet is
identical to the unity of each moment of consciousness
(see Husserl, 1970, p. 545).
Meditation and the Neural-Self
What one is able to learn from the maturation
of awareness reported by advanced meditators fits well
with how the neurosciences describe how the brain
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develops consciousness. Insight meditation of any kind
is essentially the disciplined turning of the spotlight
of consciousness upon the internal processes of the
transcendental self. It is clear now from research on
the neuropsychology of meditation that the process of
introspection is one that involves a reorganization of
the neural-self (Davidson, 1976; Damasio, 2003, 2010;
Deshmukh, 2006; Luders, Clark, & Toga, 2011; Luders
et al., 2012; Shapiro & Walsh, 1984; Varela, Thompson,
& Rosch, 1991; Varela & Shear, 1999; Xu et al., 2014).
Moreover, this picture is consistent with Carl Jung’s
insistence that when one takes an active role in one’s own
individuation (maturation of the psyche), one ends up a
qualitatively different person than if one’s individuation
unfolds unconsciously (see e.g., Jung, 1967, paragraph
241).
A self-aware neural-self is different both
experientially and structurally than a non-aware
self or empirical ego. Indeed, neuropsychologically
speaking, awareness of self is mediated differently than
awareness of the Other (Decety & Sommerville, 2003).
The introspective mind-state is mediated by a discrete
organization in the brain (Heatherton et al., 2006), and
as that system of networks develops through repetitive
application of self-awareness, the introspective faculty
grows, strengthens, and reorganizes (Goldberg, Harel,
& Malach, 2006; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, &
Raichle, 2001; Murphy & Donovan, 1999). As more
is learned about how the brain mediates its own selfreflection , there is a concomitant and growing realization
among researchers of the value of introspective,
phenomenological, and meditative research in science
(Tart, 2001; Wallace, 2007, 2009).
Parenthetically, clinical psychologists have
studied an interesting syndrome that seems relevant
to the neural underpinnings of no-self—so called
depersonalization syndrome (Sierra, 2009). The condition
has its roots in early childhood, and onset after middleage is rare. It appears to be a consequence of childhood
anxiety (Lee, Kwok, Hunter, Richards, & David, 2012),
and there is no generally recognized treatment for the
disorder. Normal children and young adults may also
experience recurrent episodes of depersonalization.
Moreover, researchers have experimentally induced
the state in normal subjects using the drug flumazenil,
a GABA A receptor antagonist (Cerqueira, Hallak,
Crippa, & Nardi, 2012). Depersonalization is a disorder
experienced as a detachment of awareness from emotions
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(sometimes referred to as a numbing of emotions) and
the sensorium (sensory experience being, as it were, at
a distance and unreal; sense of disembodiment). Brain
imaging studies have shown that there is no damage to
sensorium or limbic structures leading to the suggestion
that depersonalization is a state of dissociation of
the awareness structures of the brain from those
mediating the senses and feelings. In studies in which
normal subjects were given repeated electrical shocks,
the subjects reported distinct depersonalization—a
phenomenological remove from sensorial experience—
and this was accompanied by a dramatic flattening of
sympathetic nervous system reactivity (Oswald, 1959).
The best guess at present, based upon neural imaging
studies, is that depersonalization is mediated by prefrontal
cortical structures mediating awareness that disassociate
themselves from emotional and sensory inputs—that is,
they inhibit lower areas such as the insula and amygdala.
It is also significant that the degree of severity of specific
symptoms like de-realism, threatened self, panic attacks
and the like will vary across cultures, and is especially
related to individualist vs. collectivist constructions of
the self (Sierra & David, 2007). It is entirely possible
that the mechanisms responsible for depersonalization
are active in the realization of no-self, as well as other
meditation-related transpersonal experiences, although
the motivation would be entirely different. As Castillo
(1991) has noted for the practice of Hindu yoga:
Yogis experience themselves as dual entities.
That is, they have two coconscious selves—a self
participating in the world, and an uninvolved
observing self—both aware of each other. To yogis
this is experienced as "true renunciation"—that is,
the renunciation of the participating self through
identification with the observing self. This subjective
experience serves to illustrate the power of culture in
the constitution of experience and behavior. (p. 1)
It is also significant that as reorganization of the
neural-self progresses, direct experience may produce
dissonance relative to culturally received categories and
local models of self and consciousness. Indeed, as Murphy
and Throop (2010) have shown, received categories
may become fuzzy in the extreme in order to remain
adaptive to changing experience and neuropsychological
maturation (see also Kosko, 1993; Laughlin, 1993; Rosch,
1978). For example, in many cultures it is difficult and
perhaps even irrelevant to make crisp distinctions among
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alternative states of consciousness. For instance, Barbara
Herr (1981, p. 334) has described the fuzzy boundaries
Fijians draw between what in Western psychology are
called dream, hallucination, and vision. Bill Merrill
(1992) has described similar fuzziness of such categories
among the Ramámiru people of Mexico.
A crisp distinction between dreaming and
meditation becomes moot as well in the experience of
advanced meditators in Western society. For instance,
RM, a close friend of mine and one of the most advanced
meditators I have known, shared this dream sequence
with me:

used to define the “me” somehow magically vanish.
The sequelae of realizing no-self really involve a yearslong process of disengagement from and identification
with those mental factors. What falls away is the belief
that there exists a single seamless person, a permanent
“me,” that is at the center of all this mental and
physical conditioning. What does remain is Husserl’s
transcendental ego (see above), the inevitable pure
subjectivity in each moment of consciousness.

The “true nature of mind” to which RM alluded is in
part the inherent impermanence of any and all content
in the stream of consciousness, including anything that
might correspond to a fixed, enduring soul, ego, self,
or identity. This does not mean that all of the feelings,
perceptions, self-concepts, habits, and so forth that

Stream-Entry
he penultimate experience in Theravada Buddhist
vipassana meditation is sotāpatti (stream-entry)
or nirodha-samapattî (cessation). A meditator who has
attained stream-entry is called a sotāpanna, or streamwinner. In Japanese Zen, this experience is called
satori or kenshō. Whatever term used, this experience is
considered to be the first conscious absorption into and
realization of Nirvana (see Amaro & Pasanno, 2009;
Bodhi, 1999; Khema, 1994; Thanissaro, 2012a, 2012b).
The Samye-Ling Retreat
My own experience of stream-entry occurred in
1982 toward the end of a two month retreat at Kagyu
Samye Ling Tibetan Buddhist meditation center in
southern Scotland. At the beginning of the retreat I
was alternating two types of meditation, one being a
Tibetan Tantric meditation upon a deity known as
Khorlo Demchog, a standing, blue, fierce, male figure
embracing the red female deity Dorje Pakmo in sexual
union while they dance together in flames. I was not using
the complex instructions (sadhana) for the construction
of the image of the deities. I was simply working from
a photograph of the scene and internalizing it until I
was able to evoke the eidetic image at will and in detail
without the picture (another kind of kasn.a practice; see
above).
With this retreat my consciousness seemed to
have “learned set” (as Harry Harlow used to say) and
the visualization meditation developed far more rapidly
than during previous occasions. After a period of days,
the Demchog/Dorje Pakmo imagery took on a life of
its own and the meditation no longer required evoking
the eidetic image. The dancing couple would pop up
and move around my sensorium performing different
positions and movement that became meaningful to me
at an intuitive level. The imagery was never so strong
that I could hallucinate the imagery with my eyes open.
The imagery was more like a dream or vision.
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I am looking down a long ramp. It is bright daylight,
a blue white light. Attractive females appear before
me beckoning me down the slope. I know these
women, but not by name. They call me on, then
as I get close they fade and another appears. The
pace is slow and deliberate, no hurry. The sequence
eventually fades to light.
A few nights later, I had another dream in which
I enter a large space, like a gym, no ornaments or
distractions. Ahead, I see an older man playing
basketball with a few young boys, and I walk up
to them. The older master notices me approaching
and asks “are you interested?” I don’t need to answer
verbally, it is understood, I am interested. He leads
me to a side room. I sit, and he holds up a platter
of small objects. I am to choose one. The master
moves the platter to my forehead, and I am led to
choose a small black bowl. The third eye is now fully
open with light streaming. The master’s voice says
“you have chosen death.” Everything dissolves into
light and I am aware now of moving from a lucid
dream state into fully conscious meditation with
full concentration and at one with the universe,
samadhi. The meditation now had its focus, or koan,
the question had been answered. Calm, peaceful,
abiding. To be reborn or to redefine ourselves, we
need to experience the death of the self. We need to
leave behind the constructs that impede our ability
to see the true nature of mind.

T

Because I was heavily influenced by C. G. Jung,
I had always assumed that male and female deities in
sexual union (yab-yum) were a symbolic representation
of the male and female aspects of my own unconscious.
Their movements, interactions, postures, and so forth
communicated to me what the relationship between my
male and female (the latter my anima, as Jung called
the cross-sex aspect of the male psyche; see Laughlin,
2001) processes were up to in the moment. The dancing
imagery became more and more autonomous, and I
became more and more comfortable with the meditation
taking its own course. Eventually, the imagery began to
simplify and the humanoid imagery transformed into
two spheres of light (bindus, in Buddhist terms; Tibetan:
thig le), one blue and the other rose, that danced (moved,
circled) around each other, sometimes separating,
sometimes merging, sometimes one bigger than the
other. Sometime later a much smaller third sphere would
appear between the blue and rose spheres, usually a
golden color. I interpreted the appearance of the third
sphere as representative of my self-awareness (or watcher),
identifying neither with the male nor the female aspect.
After a period of days, if I tried to construct the
eidetic image of Demphog/Dorje Pakmo, the spheres
would immediately pop up to take their place in the
sensorium. I was no longer able to hold a complex yab-yum
image of any kind without an immediate transformation
of the imagery to spontaneous bindu imagery—a
process I have learned to interpret as simplification
and purification of countersigns (patibhaganimitta; see
above). Interestingly, the bindus became permanent. To
this day, some thirty-plus years later, all I have to do is
close my eyes and concentrate on the inner screen of the
visual sensorium and the bindus appear, and their activity
reflects the state of my consciousness at the moment. At
some point in this retreat I realized how the so called yinyang symbol may have originated in the direct experience
of ancient Chinese contemplatives.
The second type of meditation I used during
the Samye-Ling retreat was mindfulness of the breath
(ānāpānasmr.ti), as taught in Theravada Buddhism. I
would either focus my attention upon the breath entering
and leaving a nostril, or follow the breath down to the
pit of my stomach and then lodge my focus on one of
the chakras along the central channel as I imagined it
to be, just forward of my spine. I would often visualize
a tiny pea-sized blue bubble (bindu) with a Buddha
figure in it moving up or down the central channel, or
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situated in a chakra.7 I used the breath concentration to
deepen the calm and increase the concentration that I
was using in the yab-yum work. Meanwhile, there were
other interesting experiences going on as well, especially
while dreaming (see Laughlin, 2011, Chap. 13 for more
details). These were directly related to the core work of the
two alternating meditations I planned to do throughout
the retreat.
However, as the two previously distinct
meditations developed—or, perhaps more accurately,
as my consciousness developed during the course of
the meditations—they merged into a single exercise of
awareness that led eventually to stream-entry. Whether
beginning with the yab-yum, or the breathing meditation,
I quickly would reach the state of access concentration
(upacara samadhi; see above). In that state I had the
choice of meditating upon any aspect of consciousness to
the exclusion of all else. The instructions one receives in
Buddhist meditation training (so-called pith instructions)
is that regardless of what the original meditation, once
access concentration is reached and stabilized, the focus
of concentration should shift to the arising and passing of
phenomena. I followed this instruction assiduously, and
as the retreat proceeded, more and more time was spent
in this state and upon this focus. I had realized some time
before the retreat that if sufficient concentration were
focused upon an object or other aspect of phenomena, an
absorption experience would likely arise. As I have said
above, in access concentration, the mature contemplative
can choose to enter or avoid absorption (the jhānas; see
above)—using absorption and its numinous qualities to
energize the main focus of meditation, whatever that
may be.
Stream-Entry
The constant, unremitting, and concentrated
focus of awareness upon arising and passing in access
concentration was usually upon the field on sensorial
particles, and the residue of the two types of meditation
had simplified into a choice between concentrating on
the blue and rose spheres and what they were telling me
about the mind-state at the moment, or subtly shifting
focus to the arising and passing of the particles that made
up the sensorium in all modes (visual, auditory, tactile,
somaesthetic, feelings, so forth), including constituting
the spheres. I spent most of the time for days opting to
focus on the arising and passing of these sensory dots.
Eventually a sudden realization arose (instantaneous
intuition) that there was actually no arising, and that
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the entire sensorium was passing. From that moment
my meditation focused upon the passing of the field
of sensorial particles. This shift in awareness, be it
ever so subtle, led within hours to stream-entry. One
moment I was concentrating on the passing of sensorial
dots, the next the entire sensorium fell away like a vast
cosmic “dump” and all that remained was diamondclear awareness with no sensory field whatever. The
experience must have been momentary, but during its
duration there was no sense of time, no sense of space,
no arising or passing of phenomena, no thoughts, no
feelings, no movement, no desires or aversions, no
choice, no coming or going—total liberation from
the tyranny of phenomena over consciousness. The
experience is ineffable simply because the only way to
describe it to others is by way of metaphors, which of
course are drawn from the experience of phenomena.
There is no way to speak of Nirvana, save by the use of
words that connote sensory objects or concepts. Even
the word Nirvana itself is a metaphor, meaning to blow
out the flames of desire and aversion. For that duration
there was not a scintilla of phenomenal reality. There is
just what I would call pure awareness with only itself
as object.
The moments following stream-entry were
filled with inexpressible joy, for with the memory of
the experience was simultaneous comprehension of its
significance—that I had won through to the essence of
mind, that I had realized sotāpatti (Mahāsi Sayādaw,
1994) Very soon after this realization, within minutes
as I recall, I understood completely why the masters
taught that three fetters automatically fall away as a
consequence of one’s first experience of stream-entry
(see, e.g., Thanissaro, 2012b): (1) belief that I exist
as a permanent phenomenon (for me this had largely
fallen away earlier; see above), (2) doubt about the goal
of Buddhist meditation, and (3) belief that rituals or
other practices are the goal of the path to liberation.
As the Alagaddupama Sutta notes, “In the Dhamma
[the Buddha’s teachings] thus well-proclaimed by me—
clear, open, evident, stripped of rags—those monks
who have abandoned the three fetters, are all streamwinners, steadfast, never again destined for states of
woe, headed for self-awakening” (Thanissaro, 2004).
From my experience of the moments just following
stream-entry, I had acquired apodictic knowledge of
what constitutes the goal of Buddhadharma, and that
any practice that does not aid in attaining stream-entry

For another thing, meditation for me boiled down
to whatever work I have had to do to become centered
and tranquil enough to enter access concentration, and
then to focus upon the passing of phenomena. This
work has continued to mature in very subtle ways. Very
recently I came close to entering the stream for a second
time, an event that is called phalasamapatti, or attainment
of fruition (Mahāsi Sayādaw, 1994, p. 34). This occurs
when the knowledge of Nirvana, or the stream (the
cognitive fruits), has matured sufficiently that one may
re-enter the stream with greater awareness than the first
time, and without aversive reactions that will hinder the
letting go into the stream (Mahāsi Sayādaw, 1994). This
happened for me in this way:
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is false and a hindrance to the path. I also understood
the truth of the words one of my teachers, Namgyal
Rinpoche, had said to me, “Complex meditations are
for dull minds.”
Consequences of Stream-Entry
There have been for me numerous consequences
of the experience of stream-entry—usually summarized
as the fruits of stream-entry (Sanskrit: sotāpatti phala).
For one thing, I came to understand that realization
of sensorial dots is neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for stream-entry. All that is absolutely required
is the ability to enter access concentration and tenacious
concentration upon the arising and passing, and then
the passing of phenomena. Others would seem to have
experienced stream-entry in something like the way I
did. For instance, Ekaku Hakuin (2010) wrote that:
“At around midnight on the seventh and final night of
my practice, the boom of a bell from a distant temple
reached my ears: suddenly, my body and mind dropped
completely away. I rose clear of even the finest dust.
Overwhelmed with joy” (p. 23). In addition, Robert
Bellah (2008) related the experience of an eighteenth
century Zen monk and teacher, Ishida Baigan, who,
after meditating for years, had this experience:
Late one night, he lay down exhausted, and was
unaware of the break of day. He heard the cry of a
sparrow in the woods behind where he was lying.
Then within his body it was like the serenity of a
great sea or a cloudless sky. He felt the cry of that
sparrow like a cormorant diving and entering the
water, in the serenity of a great sea. After that he
abandoned the conscious observation of his own
nature. (pp.201–202)

I became lucid in a dream in which I was meditating
(I believe I was in a temple of some kind) and
turned my attention to the passing away of dream
phenomena. So intense did the concentration
become that I was no longer dreaming, but was
in access concentration watching the field of dots
that constituted hypnopompic imagery, and then
the field of dots alone without form—the imagery
had fallen away. At a particular moment, I realized
I was headed back into stream—I recognized the
symptoms as the field of dots began to “dump” so
that all that remained before the mind’s eye was
rapidly passing sensorial dots. My foreknowledge of
the experience of entering stream, which had been
absent when I experienced sotāpatti, got in the way
of letting go. At the last moment there was a small
but sufficient aversive reaction to stop the process
leading to phalasamapatti.
Despite having hindered the process of letting go into
the stream, I experienced intense joy and after some
moments realized that, while my clinging to phenomenal
reality was still too strong to allow the experience a
second time, the bonds are weakening and I am getting
closer. I also realized that it is only that aversion, that
clinging to phenomena (or form; Mahāsi Sayādaw, 1994,
p. 34), that stands in the way of my being able to enter
the stream at will, and remaining there if I chose.
Within a week or so of leaving Samye-Ling for
the United States, some of the other consequences of
stream-entry began to present themselves, some of them
in the dream state. One particularly memorable dream
occurred while I was staying in Philadelphia:
I dreamed that I was standing hand in hand with
my child self under a fiery arch that had morphed
from two enormous serpents that had arisen on each
side of us and touched their heads above us. I was
lucid and watching the scene from a position behind
the fiery portal and my dream selves, so I could
see they were located on a vast plain upon which
stood the ruins of a city. I knew in the dream that
I was looking at the transformation of myself after
the realizations of the past [Samye-Ling] retreat. I
was beginning to awaken from the dream and was
in a hypnopompic state when a fiery golden chariot
being drawn by huge golden horses appeared out
of an intense, almost blinding golden light, and a
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deep, booming voice called out, "Read Ezekiel!"
This image could not have lasted more than a few
seconds, but I awoke knowing that I had not (and
indeed have never since) experienced a dream like
that. (Laughlin, 2011, p. 191–192)
I did not own a Bible and did not recall ever
reading the book of Ezekiel, although I might have
encountered the fiery chariot motif in my childhood
Methodist bible classes. I obtained a copy of the Old
Testament later that same day and was astonished when
I read of God appearing before the prophet in the form
of a fiery chariot pulled by Chayot (mystical angels), and
that much of the book was about the destruction of the
old Jerusalem and the construction of the City of God
upon its ashes. I also noted that the creatures pulling
the chariot in my dream were definitely horses, and not
the mythical angels of the Biblical imagery. This dream
happened over thirty years ago, and it is still as clear,
numinous and meaningful to me today as it was then.
For me, this was clearly an indication that the streamentry experience was resulting in transformations at a
very deep level of my psyche.
Discussion
urning the subjectivity of transpersonal experiences
into publically available, scientifically useful data
is sometimes not an easy thing to accomplish (Rock
& Laughlin, 2014). I once addressed this issue as the
“problem of the phenomenological typewriter;” namely,
presuming that ethnographers, by means of participant
observation, successfully attain the experiences intended
by mythic drama, ordeal, drug trip, ritual and other
methods of an alien culture's religion, how then do they
describe those experiences so that they become publicly
available data (Laughlin, 1989)? As an anthropologist,
my commitment has been first and foremost to science—
to grounding experiential anthropology in a Jamesian
“radical empiricism,” if you will (James, 1912/1976;
Laughlin & McManus, 1995; Taylor, 1996). By that
I mean that no experience had by human beings from
whatever cultural background is too outré to be included
as data under scientific scrutiny.
Ineffability and Poetics
The rarer the experience (a commonplace in
the study of mystical and transpersonal experiences),
the harder it is to render the information gleaned from
the experience into a scientifically comparative form.
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All too often the description of a rare experience is
set aside as somehow too anecdotal to be considered
scientific. This is especially true in the present case, for
any attempt to describe “path moment” (sotāpatti) in
natural language will perforce require that one resort
to similes and metaphors—even the terms “path” and
“moment,” “stream” and “enter”, are similes. Indeed,
with respect to the direct experience of sotāpatti, there is
no path, no stream, no entering, no time-consciousness,
no space (thus the term “empty” is also just a simile)—in
fact phenomenally speaking, there is no anything save
awareness .
Always keeping in mind that there is no such
thing as an experience that admits of one and only one
interpretation, one nonetheless develops a basis in
transpersonal experiences for understanding how
particular metaphors come to stand for what are largely
ineffable states. Take for instance anthropologist, Carol
Laderman’s (1988, 1993) experience while researching
Malay shamanic healing. She found that Malays were
reluctant to talk about their experiences of the “Inner
Winds” that arise during ritual trance states. “They
told me that the only way I could know would be to
experience it myself” (1988, p. 805). Eventually, her
teacher led her through a ritual that resulted in her
entering a trance state. “At the height of my trance, I
felt the Wind blowing inside my chest with the strength
of a hurricane” (1988, p. 806; emphasis added). When
she described this experience to her informants, they
responded with comments like, “Why do you think we
call them Winds?”
This issue has been tellingly addressed by
anthropological poetics (aka ethnopoetics; see Brady, 1991;
Diamond, 1986; Hymes, 2003; Tedlock, 1999), a field
that studies the many ways language is molded to express
experiences across cultures—“...focusing in particular on
the oral communication of proverbs, laments, prayers,
praises, prophecies, curses, and riddles shaped by the
spoken, chanted, or singing voice” (Brady, 2008, p. 296).
Actually, all experiences are ineffable in that more is left
out than can be expressed. Another way to say this is that
while experiences are information rich, cognition and
language are relatively information poor. The problem
in communication is for the speaker to send sufficient
information—the right information—to trigger (or
“penetrate to”) a much larger field of information in
the mind of the hearer (Laughlin, 1989). The challenge
is even greater with communicating transpersonal

experiences such as those I have described here. As most
societies are to some extent polyphasic, people who have
extraordinary experiences face the challenge of finding
a language to share the subjective, and express the
expressible. They often have recourse to poetics, which
in all likelihood was the first and oldest art form, for
it allowed the sharing of not only sensory aspects of
alternative states of consciousness, but also intuitive
knowledge. The Buddha himself reputedly used poetry to
communicate such knowledge. The Udana (included in
the Sutta Pitaka) is partly in verse, one of which expresses
a consequence of Awakening (Buddha, 1997, Ud 2):
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When things become manifest
To the ardent meditating Brahmin ,
All his doubts then vanish since he has known
The utter destruction of conditions.
The Buddha’s verse does not express a rational
conclusion that because the conditions causing
phenomena have been de-structured, one therefore
logically concludes her doubts about the path were
unfounded. Rather, it is an expression of the fact that
with the first stream-entry experience, doubt about the
path automatically drops away. It is an intuitive knowing
that may give rise to poetic expression via imagination,
metaphor and insight. Poetics is born of the challenge
of expressing and sharing the ineffable. All societies have
their poetic forms for just this purpose. Yet in modern
technocratic societies, a schism has been erected between
poetic expression and science. This humanist-scientist
dichotomy stands as a hindrance to doing transpersonal
science, for it fails to rise to the challenge of sharing the
most effective uses of esoteric language as scientifically
useful data. Yet there is no reason (other than ideological
loyalty) that transpersonal researchers cannot embrace
what my friend and colleague, Ivan Brady calls artful
science—a methodology that is grounded in the media
of poetics. Specifically addressing anthropologists, Brady
(2005) notes that artful science:
...pursues knowledge mostly ignored or formally
discounted by the extremes of logical positivism. It
advocates as a complement (not as a replacement) to
a kind of knowing and reporting that (a) promotes
phenomenology as a philosophy that puts the
observer (the seeker, the knower) upfront in the
equation of interpreting and representing experience;
(b) pushes interpretive anthropology back into the

loop of sensual experience, a body-centered position
that includes a consideration of but transcends the
sweeping metaphor that everything (e.g., people,
landscapes) can and should be rendered as texts
to be interpreted; (c) finds some continuity in the
structures and orientations of body-roundedness
and myth despite important limitations posed by
language itself and by epistemic interference between
the present and our preliterate past; and (d) gives
poets special cachet through their offering forms of
knowing and saying (robust metaphors and more)
that can engage the senses and visions of being-inplace in ways that both exceed and complement
more conventional strategies in anthropology and
history. (pp. 981–982)
This approach is especially useful for transpersonal
researchers interested in understanding the religious art
and architecture of prehistoric peoples, as well as the
textual expressions of transpersonal experiences by long
dead literate peoples.
More on Methods
Thus far there are no technological methods
that may independently measure the activity of the
brain while, say, an arhat (Pali: arahant; a person who
is never apart from the stream; indeed may be said to be
one with the stream) is absorbed in Nirvana. She cannot
take a camera with her and record the experience. She
cannot tape record her description of the experience as it
occurs. She cannot draw or paint the experience in other
than metaphorical terms. Most importantly, we do not
know how the brain mediates stream-entry. Is sotāpatti
mediated by isolating prefrontal cortical attention
structures from the structures mediating the sensorium?
Or does the sensorium simply cease to function for the
duration of the experience, leaving in its wake something
like “pure” consciousness, consciousness with only itself
as object? We do not yet know. We do have a literature
pertaining to the psychology of post-stream-entry
sotāpanna. For example, Full, Walach, & Trautwein
(2013) interviewed advanced Burmese Theravadā
Buddhist meditators who presumably had experienced
stream-entry in order to establish whether meditation at
this level of maturity leads to significant and permanent
changes in perception. They found: “Changes could be
identified concerning the quality of perception, especially
in aspects of clarity; comprehension of interdependences
in perception processing, i.e., mental condition and
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perception; successive cessation of a subject/object-based
perception; and finally, a nonconceptual perception
including the deconstruction of the notion of I, self,
or me” (Full, Walach, & Trautwein, 2013, p. 61). But
the authors caution that their study could not parse-out
cultural conditioning that may have influenced their
data. I would add that being labeled a sotāpanna may in
some cases be due to status factors in Burmese monastic
culture—a way of acknowledging advanced status as a
meditator or teacher—and is not a guarantee that the
individual has actually experienced stream-entry. Again,
there is as yet no independent method of measuring
stream-winners.
Obviously there is also no way to draw a random
sample from a known universe of stream-winners among
all peoples everywhere. Thus the use of parametric
statistics in analyzing the data from a non-random
sample of stream winners, even when available (as in the
study above) would be invalid. Does that mean that the
study of rare states of consciousness cannot in principle be
“scientific?” Hardly. To require quantitative experimental
evidence in such cases would amount to the most absurd
kind of scientism, one that denies the foundations of
all scientific disciplines in naturalistic research. By such
an account, most of Darwin’s work aboard the Beagle
would not make the grade. In fact, as William James
argued, much can be empirically learned from individual
experiential case studies, and trait comparisons between
such studies, even when the experiences are rare and
the universe of such cases remains unknown. The great
neurologist, V. S. Ramachandran addressed this issue in
the following way: “By way of analogy, imagine that I
cart a pig into your living room and tell you that it can
talk. You might say, ‘Oh really? Show me.’ I then wave
my wand and the pig starts talking. You might respond,
‘My God! That’s amazing!’ You are not likely to say,
‘Ah, but that’s just one pig. Show me a few more and
then I might believe you’” (Ramachandran & Blakeslee,
1999, p. xiii). Neuroscience,8 as with transpersonal
studies, is grounded in single case studies; often in-depth
qualitative explorations upon which later multiple case
meta-analyses are founded.
Developmental Perspective
If there is a single lesson I have drawn from
reflecting on the signal experiences I have had over the
course of a lifetime of meditation, it is that the processes
of neuropsychological development are pivotal to both
spiritual awakening and transpersonal studies. Even when
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ethnographers appreciate the cultural significance of
transpersonal experiences and even leave themselves open
to having such experiences themselves (imbibing the
host’s entheogens, or religiously important psychotropic
drugs, participating in the local healing and other rituals
that evoke extraordinary experiences, or in the present
case, taking on the process of meditation), they have all
too often failed to realize that transpersonal experiences
may occur for their hosts in a developmental continuum
from, say, those associated with initiation early in
life to those typical to elder masters and shamans (see
Assagioli, 2007; Chinen, 1985; Wilber, 1996). In other
words, spiritual paths are developmental processes with
various experiences marking way points along the path
to full maturation. An American learning to become
a lucid dreamer, for instance, is a far cry from being a
dream shaman. In spiritual awakening, transpersonal
experiences may be both symptomatic of one’s level of
maturity, and the cause for a change in self-understanding.
With respect to the Buddhist path, my old
friend and meditation teacher, Tarchin Hearn has noted
(personal communication, 8 May 2014):

Numerous ethnographers have worked among
peoples with polyphasic cultures. Relatively few of them
have gone so far as to participate in a culture to the extent
of attaining the alternative states that ground each of the

host's worldviews. This is the common pattern among
ethnographers who have studied shamanistic religions,
many of which require initiation into the proper use
of entheogens and secret ritual practices, a process of
apprenticeship that may last for years (see the articles by
Robin Rodd, an ethnographer who has apprenticed to a
South American shaman; Rodd, 2002, 2006; Rodd &
Sumabila, 2011). There are cases in which the society’s
mythological system may reflect a developmental
progression of understanding and realization from the
simple levels of childhood through to the comprehension
of the master. For instance, Dan Jorgensen (1980)
discovered that the mythology of the Telefolmin people
of Papua New Guinea have something on the order of
ten distinct levels of complexity ranging from many
short “just-so” stories for children to a master’s level in
which all the many myths are integrated into a single
story that takes days to narrate.
The course of meditational maturation—
of meditative individuation, to wax Jungian for a
moment—is perhaps one of the most empirically
available, because more and more dedicated meditators
have become what the late Eugene d’Aquili and I liked
to call mature contemplatives (d'Aquili, Laughlin, &
McManus, 1993; Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili,
1990, Chap. 11). We now have sufficient evidence from
psychological and neuroscience research supporting the
notion that meditation results in changes in perception,
attention, affect, and cognition (see Baron Short et al.,
2010; Chiesa, Calati, & Serretti 2011; Garland, Gaylord,
Boettiger, & Howard, 2010; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime,
2007; MacLean et al., 2010; Murphy & Donovan, 1999;
Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). It also seems
very likely, as suggested by Ledi (2007), that most really
significant changes in neurophysiological, psychological,
and cognitive functions caused by meditation will be
found among mature contemplatives. For instance, it
is far easier for me to enter access concentration now
than when I first experienced it so many years ago. Still,
I am unable to access that state at will, a skill that is
prerequisite for an arhat, which I am decidedly not.
Notice that when I got close to a second absorption
into the stream (phalasamapatti), there was sufficient
aversion to letting go of phenomena to thwart the
process. What I learned from this “near miss” is that my
“clinging” to phenomena—to sensorial productions—
and my emotional reaction to sudden transformations in
consciousness have not matured sufficiently to allow the
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Many people can apprentice in a spiritual system
and become adepts and teachers of that tradition.
Not so many people can as a result of their practice,
transcend or go beyond the very tradition that
nourished them. Buddhism teaches us how to live
well in the present moment. It doesn't know what
will unfold in the moment to come. This universe has
not yet arisen. Namgyal Rinpoche once suggested
to me that I should study Buddhism, realize it and
walk on and then I should study Western traditions,
realize them and walk on. I've come to realize that
the “walking on” is the forefront of this evolving
universe in the collaborative act (with everything
and everyone else) of creative being. Put in another
way, when I was young I thought that I needed
to understand and perhaps even master Buddhist
teaching. I had no idea that Buddhist teaching was
an attempt to skillfully nudge me towards a way of
being and a field of questioning that, at the time,
I was not able to even imagine and that today I
discover hour by hour.

experience to occur. The recognition of what was about
to happen emotionally hindered the happening. I am able
to project to a time when, should I live long enough, the
emotional reaction will be either gone or of insufficient
intensity to thwart another entry into the stream.
Origins and Pervasiveness of Meditation
Meditation—defined as the “sustained
awareness aimed at nonreactive and nonattached
mental observation, without cognitive or emotional
interpretation of the unfolding moment-to-moment
experience” (Braboszcz, Hahusseau, & Delorme, 2010,
p. 1910)—is neither a recent phenomenon, nor was it
first invented by Eastern spiritual traditions (Goleman,
1996). Indeed, most of the classic meditations used by
the Buddha in his teaching were inherited from traditions
that were ancient even in his time (Gunaratana, 2002;
Wynne, 2009). As C. G. Jung (as cited in Hannah,
1981, p. 3) noted years ago, human beings have very
likely been meditating for millennia—possibly as long as
humans have been both self-aware, and able to share and
discuss subjective experiences such as fantasies, visions,
dreams, hallucinations, drug induced imagery, as well
as meditative “countersigns”, and so forth. Of course we
will never know the precise evolutionary Rubicon leading
to a “meditative brain,” for, short of a time machine, this
momentous event will remain a matter of speculation
and theory (Filmer-Lorch, 2012, pp. 6–7).
However, I would argue that prior to a certain
point in prehistory, virtually all human cultures would
have been polyphasic in their world view, grounded in
their belief that experiences had in alternative states of
consciousness are but different perspectives on reality
(Laughlin, 2013). Many cultures would have discovered
the practice of intense concentration upon images and
other somatic phenomena available to their mind’s eye,
and this perhaps widespread practice could well have
influenced the evolution of certain cognitive functions
(see Mithen, 2003; Rossano, 2007). Doubtless also,
meditation of various types would have played a central
role in ancient shamanic mysticism and healing (LewisWilliams, 1992, 1997; MacDonald , Cove, Laughlin,
& McManus, 1987; Pearson, 2002, p. 95; Peters,
1989; Winkelman, 2010, pp. 72–73). The fact that
countersigns often arise as a consequence of intense
concentration upon any object, it is suggestive that
many shamanic healing traditions involve the healer
or diagnostician meditating upon (“reading”) some
pattern ; per example, bones, entrails, sandals, stones,
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crystals, skrying bowls thrown on the ground, starlight
passing through a crystal, images in a skrying bowl, and
so forth. Of course, there is no way to know for sure
when shamanism first became linked with meditation
practices (Lewis-Williams, 1997).
A pivotal distinction must be made here:
Whereas most shamanic meditation practices very likely
involved following and interacting with dynamic imagery
in much the same way that C. G. Jung advocated in his
method of active imagination (see Jung, 1997; Von Franz,
1997[1979]), Hannah, 1981), Buddhist mindfulness
discourages interacting with imagery, except in Tantric
traditions where more shamanic methods are used solely
to energize the real work of mindfulness training, the
realization of stream-entry, and cessation of phenomena.
Keep in mind that the Buddha considered clinging
to (dialoguing with) phenomena was a major cause
of suffering (dukkha), and he wished to discover the
“builder”9 of phenomena by snuffing out this clinging
and thereby embracing cessation (Rahula, 1974). As far
as I know, no known shamanic tradition is founded upon
the realization, or even the knowledge of stream-entry.
But again, for the methodological reasons mentioned
above, we simply cannot know for sure.
Husserlian and Buddhist Methods
As noted above, I recognized many parallels
between Buddhist mindfulness practices and Husserlian
transcendental phenomenology. Indeed, I early on
suspected that Edmund Husserl was to some extent what
Buddhist psychology calls a pratyekabuddha, or “selfawakener.” This is someone who is so sufficiently advanced
in mindfulness that they rediscover the development
of the path of awakening all by themselves with no
instructions or teachers. It was clear to me that using
either Buddhist mindfulness or Husserlian “reduction”
would inevitably lead one into the same transpersonal
domains of self-awareness (Hanna, 1993b), and lead
to the most accurate phenomenological understanding
of consciousness. Moreover, considering Husserl as a
pratyekabuddha seemed to me to explain why so many of
his students and followers failed to “get it” with respect
to actually attaining the phenomenological attitude and
transpersonal comprehension. This failure is at the very
core of Husserl’s disappointment with his protégé, Martin
Heidegger, who ran off to teach university philosophy
before becoming a mature contemplative (see Husserl,
1997). Others of Husserl’s students (e.g., Eugene Fink,
Gerhard Funke, Ludwig Landgrebe) did hang around
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Husserl and did do the requisite mindfulness work,
and their comprehension of, and reflections upon the
phenomenological attitude are very useful to meditators
wishing to understand Husserlian methods (see Fink,
1995; Funke, 1987; Landgrebe, 1973).
At the time I was reading Husserl’s books, it
was part of the English-speaking Husserlian zeitgeist
that he had not come into contact with Buddhism, or
the Pali Canon, for he never mentions Buddhism in any
of his major writings. Some scholars had acknowledged
the similarities and differences between Husserlian
phenomenology and various forms of Indian philosophy
(e.g., Mohanty, 1972). Turns out, however, that Husserl
did engage with the Buddhist literature—the Pali Canon
had just been translated into German—and he even
wrote a short note expressing his feelings about what
he had read. Thanks to Fred Hanna (1995), we have an
English translation of that 1925 note entitled “On the
Teachings of Gotama [Gautama] Buddha.” In that note
Husserl seems to thoroughly identify with the aims and
methods of Buddhist phenomenology:
That Buddhism—insofar as it speaks to us from
pure original sources—is a religio-ethical discipline
for spiritual purification and fulfillment of the
highest stature—conceived of and dedicated to an
inner result of a vigorous and unparalleled, elevated
frame of mind, will soon become clear to every reader
who devotes themselves to the work. [emphasis added]
Buddhism is comparable only with the highest
form of the philosophical and religious spirit of our
European culture. It is now our task to utilize this
(to us) completely new Indian spiritual discipline
which has been revitalized and strengthened by this
contrast. (as cited in Hanna, 1995, p. 367)
One important factor influencing my use
of Husserlian methods was the simple fact that,
coming from a wealth of experience while practicing
Buddhist mindfulness (vipassana), Husserl’s methods
of bracketing, “reduction,” the epoché, returning “to
the things themselves,” etc., were perfectly transparent.
Despite his turgid prose, it was blatantly obvious to me
what Husserl’s project was about. I do not intend to get
further into Husserlian methods here, because that would
take us on another tangent—besides, my colleague Jason
Throop and I have engaged in that discussion elsewhere
(Laughlin & Throop, 2009). Suffice to say here, as Hanna
(1995) wrote: “Eugen Fink once told Dorion Cairns
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‘that the various phases of Buddhistic self-discipline
were essentially phases of phenomenological reduction’
(Cairns, 1976, p. 50). This statement is especially
significant in light of the fact that Fink was Husserl’s
chief assistant, and was considered by Husserl to be his
most trusted interpreter” (Hanna, 1995, p. 366). It is thus
also significant that Husserl considered the effort and
dedication of attaining the phenomenological attitude
results inevitably in psychological development. Again,
as Hanna (1995) notes: “Husserl claimed side benefits
of phenomenological seeing in terms of self-exploration
and self-development. He said that the insights gained
from performing the transcendental phenomenological
method of seeing brings about ‘a complete personal
transformation’ (Husserl, 1970[1936], p. 137)” (p.369).
There is one other important factor that I do
need to emphasize, and that is, I can find no evidence
that Husserl himself experienced stream-entry. His use
of the concepts of “transcendental phenomenology”
and “pure consciousness” refer more to something like
access concentration, a state few of his students and
followers apparently developed. His descriptions of
that state involve the falling away of all preconceptions,
all discursive knowledge, and a complete openness to
intuitive insight. His project was fundamentally different
than the Buddha’s in that Husserl wished to explore the
essential structures of phenomenal consciousness, and
was not guided into a course of meditation that would
lead him, or any of his students so far as I know, to
sotāpatti; that is, transcending phenomenal experience.
Moreover, my hunch has always been that, given Husserl
was perhaps a pratyekabuddha, he found it easier to enter
access concentration without the disciplined calming
and centering exercises (samatha) required by most of us
to reach that state (see also Hanna, 1995, p. 371).
Conclusion
have had numerous transpersonal experiences over the
course of the last half-century of phenomenological
exploration, especially while dreaming (see Laughlin
2011, Chap. 13). What I have described above are three
of the most seminal experiences arising during the course
of mindfulness work—the realization of sensorial dots,
of no-self, and of stream-entry. These three were not only
real experiences, they were “seal” experiences, ones that
resulted in permanent transformations in my perception,
self-knowledge, and phenomenological insight. They
are also understandable as way stations along a path
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of gradually developing, intuitive understanding of
how consciousness works. I do not mean to imply that
discerning sensorial dots or no-self are either necessary
or sufficient conditions for attaining stream-entry (hence,
a non-linear process). It is clear from the literature that
steam-entry can be attained without either previous
realizations having occurred. In those cases, the
realization of no-self, if it has not occurred previously, is
an inevitable consequence of stream-entry. Also, streamwinners may never actually realize that all phenomena
are “built” of sensorial dots. What I am able to say from
my own experiences is that, in my case, one realization
followed the other in a sequence that, in retrospect,
appears to have been the result of a maturation of
introspective view. What does seem to be a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for stream-entry is the
maturation of access concentration, for only in that state
will the consciousness be able to let go into the experience
of absorption without being hindered by aversion.
My suspicion is that I came to realize
sensorial dots and no-self independently of attaining
stream-entry because I was working as much from a
neurophenomenological perspective as from Buddhist
mindfulness (Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990).
What I was doing was bracketing processes that were
integral to perception and interpretation. I also did this
with respect to time-consciousness in a way that is not
required in Buddhist mindfulness, but is fundamental to
Husserlian phenomenology (Laughlin, 1992; Laughlin &
Throop, 2008). Nonetheless, in retrospect, it is clear to me
that one realization set me up for the next, and continues
to do so in a complex process of phenomenologicallyoriented neurocognitive development.
Any subjective, “first-person” methodology is
only useful for a science of consciousness if it produces
reports that lead to further research. At the same time,
and speaking in favor of radical empiricism, research
based upon poor phenomenological descriptions will also
produce poor science. As Dhananjay Chavan (2011) notes,
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proper training and grounding in formalized firstperson methods. (p. 248)
This said, it is hard for me to visualize a method for
studying the neuropsychological underpinnings of
the sotāpatti experience, for it lasts but a moment,
is unpredictable, and very likely cannot occur when
the meditator is wired up or lying flat-out in a fMRI
machine. But technological problems aside, this is no
reason why the experience cannot be considered as
scientifically relevant.
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Notes
1. This paper grew from a presentation delivered at
the Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness
meetings, Chicago, IL, November, 2013.
2. As opposed to what I call monophasic cultures—
those like modern China, mainstream America,
and other technocratic societies that do not
credence experiences had in alternative states of
consciousness, that do consider such experiences as
unreal (see Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990,
pp. 293–295).

3. The methodology used by the Buddha, termed
vipassana, is nothing less than a phenomenology
of mind. Indeed vipassana is ‘‘the first historical
attempt to map the human mind in a thorough and
realistic way without admixture of metaphysics and
mythology’’ (Nyanaponika Thera, 1998).
4. My first Buddhist meditation teacher was the
Venerable Tarchin Gelong (aka Tarchin Hearn),
an English born Canadian and an accomplished
insight meditator, and my second was Tarchin’s own
guru, Venerable Namgyal Rinpoche, who was also
a Canadian born meditation master who had been
recognized by the 16th Karmapa as a reincarnated
tulku, or bodhisattva. I later went on to study under
the great Sakya lama, Venerable Chogye Trichen
Rinpoche, who was also my preceptor when I
became a monk in the late 1970s at Lumbini, Nepal.
5. Husserl’s concept of the (or an) epoché derives from
the Greek epoché, meaning suspension (Husserl 1931).
A contemplative enacts an epoché every time she or
he brackets” (isolates, distinguishes, highlights)
some aspect of experience and quarantines it from
influencing the outcome of self-study.
6. A kasin.a is a colored disk used to meditate on color
or element. They are used to stimulate an eidetic
image that becomes the real object of concentration
(see Buddhaghosa, 1991; Zajonc, 2009, Chap. 4).
7. This is a variation of breathing concentration
combined with visualization that I learned from a
monk in Thailand, a member of the sangha at Wat
Pak Nam temple in Bangkok. Each monk carries a
small clear marble enclosing a golden Buddha figure
which is used as a kasin.a. I have also used blue and
red marbles as visualization devices.
8. Consider the impact of the strange case of Phineas
Gage upon 19th century neuropsychology
(Macmillan, 2000).
9. Verse 154 of the Dhammapada reads: Oh
housebuilder! You are seen, you shall build no house
again. All your rafters are broken, your roof-tree is
destroyed. My mind has reached the unconditioned
(Nibbana); the end of craving has been attained.
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